By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin.
In the shifting sands of the Red Sea region, a quiet storm has been building — a high-stakes competition among regional powers, Gulf monarchies, Egypt, Turkey, and even global players like the U.S. and China. At the center of this storm lies Somaliland, that has managed to stand alone as a beacon of stability and democracy in a region plagued by conflict and authoritarianism.
The Red Sea is no longer just a maritime trade route. It is now a strategic chessboard where dynamic shifting allegiances and alliances are made, proxies empowered, and ports transformed into outposts of regional ambition. The Gulf States, particularly the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have spent the last decade projecting their influence across this corridor. Egypt, long the dominant force in Red Sea security, is being eclipsed. Turkey, ambitious and aggressive, has inserted itself as a spoiler and a player. In this complex landscape, Somaliland must now navigate with precision — not only to secure long-overdue international recognition, but to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Background: The Historical Roots of the Rivalry
The Gulf’s involvement in the Red Sea intensified after the 2011 Arab Spring, when many monarchies feared the wave of political change. They began investing in strategic depth across the Horn of Africa:
• The UAE led the charge, signing port deals, funding infrastructure, and establishing military bases — notably in Berbera (Somaliland) and Assab (Eritrea).
• Saudi Arabia, traditionally reactive, was pulled into competition, particularly during its military campaign in Yemen (2015–present), using Djibouti and Eritrea as forward bases.
• Egypt, once unrivaled in the Red Sea due to control of the Suez Canal and its historic influence in Sudan and its support of proxies in Ethiopia over the Nile hegemony, has seen its role weakened by the proactive Gulf presence.
• Qatar, isolated by the 2017 Gulf blockade, responded by deepening ties with Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrean opposition groups, while trying to mediate in Yemen and Gaza.
• Turkey, driven by Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, gained footholds in Sudan (Suakin Island) and Somalia (a military base in Mogadishu), and backed Islamic political movements opposed by the Gulf.
These powers are not merely seeking influence. They are seeking ports, essential and critical minerals, pipelines, access to trade routes, and loyal regimes. And they are willing to spend billions to get them.
Red Sea Power Players: Who is Where by Country:
In Yemen: The UAE backed Southern Transitional in Council in Aden and made port deals, while Qatar and Saudi response backed official government in Sana’a via Saudi-led coalition. Turkey was in volved in limited covert support.
In the Sudan: the UAE supported Bashir regime, post coup generals and Qatar also backed Bashir while Saudi backed the transition. Turkey, made the Suakin Island deal which was later cancelled.
In Ethiopia: UAE invested via Berbera corridor, but the Qatar and Saudi use cautious soft diplomacy and are less involved directly while Turkey uses soft political diplomacy.
In Djibouti: The UAE lost DP World deal to China. Saudi and Qatar have Balanced ties with all and Turkeys involvement is described as low activity.
As for Somalia: UAE funded the federal states, but later clashed with Villa Somalia. Qatar to this day backs Villa Somalia while Turkey has a military base there is heavily involved in military and police training.
Somaliland: The UAE invested $422 million in Port/road deals, military access (Berbera). Qatar has minimal presence until recent president Cirro’s visit while Saudi has no formal presence.
Somaliland’s Strategic Leverage:
After decades of diplomatic stagnation, Somaliland under President Cirro is in motion. His administration has embarked on shuttle diplomacy, leveraging the Red Sea’s renewed importance to push for recognition and economic investment:
First, UAE welcomed President Cirro like a head of state, renewed Berbera partnership, signed investment deals, and deepened security cooperation. UAE’s strategic goal? A stable land corridor to Ethiopia that it controls, bypassing Djibouti.
Secondly, Djibouti, previously upset over the Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU under former President Muse Bihi, is now warming up again under Cirro’s leadership — aware that being sidelined from Berbera threatens its dominance.
Kenya, was a a major diplomatic success as Cirro opened a diplomatic office in Nairobi, and was given a presidential welcome by his counterpart, angering Mogadishu but signaling a shift in regional allegiances.
Meanwhile, the United States, AFRICOM’s 8-day visit to Berbera and Hargeisa was no coincidence. It followed U.S. concerns over Chinese naval ambitions and Russian expansion. Sources suggest a draft deal for exclusive U.S. access in exchange for semi-recognition or full recognition.
And now, president Cirro is Doha, Qatar by special invitation — and the region is watching closely. Qatar has historically supported Somalia’s federal government and the “One Somalia” policy. But the winds may be shifting.
What Does Qatar Want?
Qatar’s invitation to Cirro is strategically timed. With UAE dominance in Berbera, Saudi Arabia eyeing port access, and the U.S. possibly moving in, Qatar doesn’t want to be left out. But its intentions are unclear:
It may pressure Somaliland to reopen talks with Somalia which many Somalilanders oppose, regardless of Qatar’s good record of mediation in conflic zones and may seek a diplomatic win. It may also offer economic projects in exchange for political neutrality. A way to secure a quiet stake in Berbera without full endorsement. It may also be a shifting away from the “One Somalia” policy. If Qatar recalibrates, it could open the door for other African and Arab nations to recognize Somaliland.
Whatever the outcome of President Ciro’s visit, Somaliland must be cautious. Re-engaging with Somalia without preconditions or guarantees risks undermining its hard-earned sovereignty, especially after Somalia’s recent interference in Sool and Sanaag, which provocatively violated Somaliland’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by sending its Prime Minister there and announcing recognition of these regions as part of Somalia.
Strategic Recommendations for Somaliland:
To survive and thrive in this regional chessboard, Somaliland must:
1. Maintain non-alignment among rival powers while selectively deepening bilateral ties with those offering concrete recognition pathways.
2. Leverage Berbera’s strategic value not just for trade but for diplomacy — offering access without giving up sovereignty.
3. Avoid being used as a pawn in Gulf rivalries. Engage Qatar, but do not compromise on the principle of irrevocable independence.
4. Solidify African support, especially from Ethiopia and Kenya — as their recognition may unlock others.
5. Public diplomacy: Somaliland must tell its story in Arabic, Somali, Amharic, Swahili and English — using media, diplomacy, and education to reach African and Arab audiences directly.
In the Final Analysis:
Somaliland stands at a historic crossroad. For decades, its case for recognition was dismissed, delayed, or derailed. But now — in the midst of regional competition and strategic realignment — it has leverage, visibility, and momentum.
But leverage is useless unless it’s used wisely. President Cirro’s diplomacy must balance openness with principle, partnership with sovereignty. The Red Sea is no longer calm — and Somaliland must sail it with vision and vigilance. President Ciro is so far doing well in this geopolitics chessboard, and knows to move the right pieces and stay on track.
Prof. Nassir Kahin, is a political analyst and academic specializing in international law, Red Sea geopolitics, and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He is the Managing Editor of Bridging Somaliland News Media (https:hornofafricastrategicreview.com) and regularly publishes insights on both regional and international diplomacy and strategic affairs pertaining to Somaliland and the Horn of Africa region.
About The Author: Prof. Nassir Kahin, is a political analyst and academic specializing in international law, International Relations, Dynamics of African/Midle East Politics, Red Sea geopolitics, and Somaliland’s quest for recognition. He is the Managing Editor of Bridging Somaliland News Media (https:hornofafricastrategicreview.com) and regularly publishes insights on both regional and international diplomacy and strategic affairs pertaining to Somaliland and the Horn of Africa region.
About the Author
