Skip to content
HOASR

Horn of Africa Strategic Review (HOASR)

Geopolitics| Strategy| Analysis| Insights

Primary Menu
  • Home
  • Israel Somaliland Relations
  • Energy & Strategic Minerals
  • Somaliland Recognition
  • Global Power Geopolitics
  • Politics & Government
  • Security and Military Affairs
  • Editorial Analysis
  • Horn of Africa & Red Sea Security
  • Media Hub
  • Opinion & Analysis
  • Culture & Society
  • Horn & Red Sea Weekly Review
  • Archive
Home
  • Home
  • Politics & Government
  • MOGADISHU’S MAYDAY? Has Somalia Entered Its Most Dangerous Constitutional Crisis Since State Collapse?
  • Politics & Government

MOGADISHU’S MAYDAY? Has Somalia Entered Its Most Dangerous Constitutional Crisis Since State Collapse?

This reality inevitably raises another question. What does Somalia’s instability mean for Somaliland?
hornofafricastrategicreview.com June 4, 2026
Somalia vs. Somaliland

The contrast between Hargeisa and Mogadishu may be approaching a historic inflection point!

Written by hornofafricastrategicreview.com

 

By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

  • Somalia Constitutional Crisis!

 Has Somalia Entered Its Most Dangerous Constitutional Crisis Since State Collapse?

 

When I wrote “Is Mogadishu Facing a Kabul-Style Collapse?” on May 16, many observers viewed the comparison as provocative. Some dismissed it as political commentary. Others argued that Somalia’s institutions, despite their weaknesses, remained sufficiently resilient to prevent a major constitutional breakdown.

Less than a month later, events on the ground suggest those warnings deserve serious reconsideration.

Somalia now finds itself confronting a convergence of crises that extend far beyond ordinary political disagreement. What began as a dispute over constitutional amendments and electoral arrangements has evolved into a broader struggle over legitimacy, authority, and the future direction of the Somali state itself.

At the center of this crisis stands President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

His constitutional mandate expired on May 15, yet his administration continues to govern under constitutional amendments that opposition leaders reject as illegitimate. Supporters argue that the amendments legally extended presidential and parliamentary terms to facilitate a transition toward one-person-one-vote elections. Critics view the move as a unilateral attempt to prolong executive power without national consensus.

The dispute is not merely legal. It is profoundly political.

For more than three decades, Somalia has struggled to establish a constitutional framework accepted by all major stakeholders. Every government since 1991 has faced the same challenge: how to balance federalism, clan representation, democratic legitimacy, and state authority in a deeply fragmented political landscape.

Those questions remain unresolved.

The collapse of internationally supported negotiations inside the heavily fortified Halane compound exposed the depth of the divide. Despite mediation efforts involving Western partners, opposition leaders and the federal government failed to reach common ground on elections, constitutional reform, or the political roadmap ahead.

The symbolism was striking.

Somalia’s most important political negotiations were taking place inside a foreign-protected enclave rather than through trusted national institutions. For many Somalis, this highlighted a reality that has persisted since the country’s collapse in 1991: the state’s dependence on external actors remains deeply embedded within its political architecture.

The security environment has further complicated matters.

Al-Shabaab continues to demonstrate remarkable resilience despite years of military operations, international assistance, and regional security interventions. The group’s ability to conduct attacks, maintain influence across large rural areas, and challenge government authority remains one of the most significant obstacles to state consolidation.

Yet the greatest threat facing Mogadishu may not be military defeat.

It may be institutional exhaustion.

History demonstrates that states rarely collapse because of a single battle or political disagreement. Instead, they weaken gradually as public confidence erodes, governing institutions lose legitimacy, and competing centers of authority emerge.

Somalia appears increasingly vulnerable to precisely that process.

Federal member states remain divided from the central government. Political opposition has hardened. Constitutional consensus is absent. Security challenges persist. Public frustration over corruption, governance failures, and economic hardship continues to grow.

These dynamics have led some analysts to draw uncomfortable parallels with Afghanistan before the fall of Kabul in 2021.

The comparison should not be interpreted literally. Al-Shabaab is not the Taliban, and Somalia’s circumstances differ significantly from Afghanistan’s. However, the underlying concern is similar: a government increasingly dependent on external support while struggling to secure broad domestic political legitimacy.

Whether Somalia ultimately experiences such an outcome remains uncertain.

What is increasingly clear, however, is that the country has entered one of the most dangerous political periods of the post-1991 era.

This reality inevitably raises another question.

What does Somalia’s instability mean for Somaliland?

For decades, the international community has maintained a policy centered on preserving Somalia’s territorial integrity while postponing a definitive resolution of Somaliland’s status.

That approach now faces growing scrutiny.

While Mogadishu struggles with constitutional disputes and political fragmentation, Somaliland enters its thirty-fifth year of restored sovereignty having built functioning institutions, conducted competitive elections, maintained relative stability, and expanded its strategic relevance within the Horn of Africa.

The contrast has become impossible to ignore.

Increasingly, policymakers and strategic planners are evaluating Somaliland not solely through the lens of historical grievances but through the lens of governance performance, Maritime Security, and regional stability.

The strategic importance of Berbera, the Red Sea corridor, and Somaliland’s geographic position near the Bab El-Mandeb has further elevated its international profile.

As global competition intensifies across the Red Sea region, the question facing external powers is changing.

The debate is no longer simply whether Somaliland deserves recognition.

The debate is becoming whether continued non-recognition serves the strategic interests of the international community.

That shift represents a profound geopolitical transformation.

The future remains uncertain. Somalia may yet find a political settlement capable of preserving national cohesion. Constitutional compromises remain possible. Dialogue could still prevail over confrontation.

But one fact is undeniable.

The political divergence between Mogadishu and Hargeisa has reached a historic magnitude.

And that divergence may ultimately become one of the defining geopolitical realities shaping the future of the Horn of Africa.

 

Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin
hornofafricastrategicreview.com
Publisher & Managing Editor at Horn of Africa Strategic Review | Web

Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin is a researcher, educator, journalist, and geopolitical analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, international law, diplomacy, and strategic affairs. To read Full Bio click on this link: ABOUT THE AUTHORProf. Nassir Hussein Kahin

  • hornofafricastrategicreview.com
    WASHINGTON OPENS A DOOR AS IGAD KEEPS ONE CLOSED: Somaliland’s Place in the New Red Sea Order
  • hornofafricastrategicreview.com
    US vs China in the Red Sea: Why Somaliland has moved into the center of great power competition
  • hornofafricastrategicreview.com
    HOASR WEEKLY REVIEW  | The Houthis Hold the Choke Point and Somaliland Must Move
  • hornofafricastrategicreview.com
    Irro’s Washington Mission: The Real Test for Somaliland Recognition
Tweet
Share
Pin
Share

Post navigation

Previous: The Beginning of the End for the One-Somalia Policy?
Next: Beyond Strategic Ambiguity: Why Washington Should Follow Israel and Recognize Somaliland

Media Hub

Minister Khadar in Odweine
  • Opinion & Analysis
  • Politics & Government

Somaliland’s Presidency Problem: When a Minister Begins to Look Like the President

Ambassador Ahmed Hassan Egal August 24, 2026
Fahiima Yusuf Quuje
  • Editorial Analysis
  • Politics & Government

Reconciliation Over Retribution: Why Somaliland’s Greatest Victory Is Winning Back Its Own People

hornofafricastrategicreview.com July 19, 2026
1A957315-B3A7-4E38-AB7B-1077B5903916
  • Editorial Analysis
  • Politics & Government

Recognition Is Not Enough: Why Minority Inclusion Is Somaliland’s Next Statehood Test

hornofafricastrategicreview.com June 30, 2026

Israel Somaliland Relations

Israeli Minister Amichai Chikli’s response to the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement explicitly named Somaliland among the partnerships Israel should deepen.
  • Israel Somaliland Relations
  • Somaliland Recognition

The Recognition Front: Amichai Chikli’s Makkah Pact Warning Places Somaliland at the Centre of Israel’s Emerging Counter-Alignment

hornofafricastrategicreview.com August 11, 2026
Geopolitical illustration of Israel strengthening relations with Somaliland to secure the Red Sea and counter Houthi threats
  • Israel Somaliland Relations

Why Israel Chose Somaliland as Its Strategic Partner in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

hornofafricastrategicreview.com August 6, 2026 1
Why-Israel-Chose-Somaliland
  • Israel Somaliland Relations

The Return of the Periphery? Israel, Somaliland and the Horn of Africa after October 7

Dr. Asher Lubotzky August 6, 2026 1
Somaliland Leads
  • Editorial Analysis
  • Israel Somaliland Relations

Beyond Recognition: Can the Israel–Somaliland Partnership Help Build a New Indo-Abrahamic Maritime Order?

hornofafricastrategicreview.com August 3, 2026
HOASR Media Hub
  • Israel Somaliland Relations
  • Media Hub

Inside the new Muslim state that proudly supports Israel: The brink in Somaliland with Rageh Omaar

hornofafricastrategicreview.com July 5, 2026
  • September 2026
  • August 2026
  • July 2026
  • June 2026
  • May 2026
  • April 2026
  • March 2026
  • September 2025
  • August 2025
  • July 2025
  • June 2025
  • May 2025
  • April 2025
  • March 2025
  • February 2025
  • Home
  • Horn of Africa Strategic Review
  • About
  • Ownership & Team
  • Editorial Policy
  • Terms of Service
  • Contact Us
  • ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Copyright 2025 Horn of Africa Strategic Review Media Company All Rights Reserved. | MoreNews by AF themes.